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1 Introduction
This article analyses the evolution of labour markets
in Latin America during the reform period from the
late 1980s to the present. The first part briefly
reviews the objectives of the labour reforms included
in the package of the Washington Consensus and
identifies some specific reforms introduced in Latin
America following this orientation. In the second
part, the effects of these reforms are analysed,
concentrating mainly on labour precariousness and
exclusion. The article relates this analysis to the
expansion of the concept from informal sector to
informal economy. Finally, some suggestions are
made for key elements of a strategy that aims at
protected and inclusive employment.
2 Labour reforms in Latin America: one
component in a structural reform package
Labour reforms were introduced as a second
generation of the reform package aimed at
structurally adjusting the Latin American economies
following the debt crisis of the early 1980s. They were
guided by three main orientations: globalisation,
privatisation and liberalisation. Countries would pass
from closed to open economies, from dominant state
participation in the economy to a subsidiary role, and
from highly regulated to free markets. Labour was
not included in the first generation of the reforms
and only at the end of the 1980s, when the
economies failed to recover as expected, were the
failures attributed to labour market rigidities and
labour reform became a priority.
Labour reforms were introduced to increase flexibility
in the labour market and to reduce the cost of labour.
Both were considered key components to improve
competitiveness based on a diagnosis that wages and
labour costs were too high. The prevailing contract for
waged workers in formal enterprises was an indefinite
labour contract, which ensured stability in the job for a
long period through high firing costs. It included prior
notice and indemnities (compensation is one month
per year worked with a ceiling of 11 months) for the
years worked, and constituted a simple and effective
way to ensure protection in countries where
unemployment compensation or social policies with
this objective were non-existent or of limited
coverage. Such contracts were useful in highly
protected economies, but globalisation and open
markets introduced constraints that impinged on the
capacity to adjust. The cost of firing under the
permanent contract in Latin America was almost
double that prevailing in OECD countries (Heckman
and Pages 2004); labour regulations are 26 per cent
higher1 than in OECD countries and exceed by 54 per
cent those in East and Pacific Asia (Loayza et al. 2006).
The labour reforms thus aimed to reduce firing costs
and to eliminate other rigidities in times of
adjustment. As acquired rights could not be affected,
the strategy followed was the introduction of
‘flexibility at the margin’ (Tokman and Martínez 1999)
by introducing atypical contracts for new hiring and
reducing the cost of dismissals. In addition, contracts
were for a fixed period as an alternative to the
permanent contract. The logic behind the reforms
was based on two assumptions. The first was that
foreign investment would be attracted by cheap
labour, and the second that competitive advantage
could be developed based on cheap labour. As was
later demonstrated, the assumptions were wrong,
since foreign capital is not attracted by low labour
costs, but by the availability of skilled workers (with
the exception of maquilas) (OECD 2002); and even if
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labour costs could be reduced, they would remain
above the costs prevailing in Asian countries, both
because of relative factor endowments with
abundant natural resources, and due to more
advanced system of labour relations in most
countries in the region. Besides, the Asian countries
have also demonstrated that low labour costs were
important to gain access to markets in the early
phases of development, but innovation and product
design have been continuously added to make them
dynamic competitors in world markets.
Eleven of the 17 Latin American countries introduced
reforms aiming at greater labour flexibility, affecting
70 per cent of wage employment (Vega-Ruiz 2005).
Even before the promotion of such labour reforms,
Spain had introduced a major reform in 1981,
searching for flexibility at the margin by introducing
12 new modalities of special contracts that involved a
reduction in firing costs and in the contributions to
social security during the first two years, focusing on
employees below 30 and above 45 years old, on the
long-term unemployed and on those with disabilities.
Colombia in 1990, Argentina in 1991 and 1995 and
Peru in 1993, were early reformers following the
same orientation, introducing alternative labour
contracts of limited duration and promotional clauses
for specific groups.2 Argentina in particular eliminated
or reduced the contributions to social security. Peru
introduced nine new modalities but also innovated by
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Figure 1 Flexibility and labour costs reduction, 1990–7*
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promoting labour decentralisation by creating firms
supplying temporary workers, firms providing services
and workers cooperatives. These in effect constituted
ways to legally operate beyond labour regulations.
The guidelines for labour reforms followed the trend
of labour relations systems in developed countries,
seeking more flexibility, decentralising collective
bargaining, upgrading skills, linking wages to
performance, all within a context of declining trade
union coverage (Locke et al. 1995). In terms of
strategies to increase competitiveness, there is a co-
existence of those based on cost reduction and those
targeted at adding value to production. The
experience of big corporations recommends starting
with the former and then advancing to the latter. The
evolution from one strategy to the other however, is
not automatic. In countries where trade unions are
weak, cost reduction strategies predominate and the
transition to added value is delayed. The result is that
the short run trade-off tends to become permanent.
3 The effects of labour reform
3.1 Employment, contracts and labour costs
Employment under atypical contracts increased
during the labour reform period and at the same
time, unregistered workers increased. Employment
under permanent contracts decreased. Labour costs
decreased, because of labour contract substitution,
as well as the reduction of contributions charged to
the wage bill.
Figure 1 shows that the contract structure became
more flexible and labour costs decreased between
1990 and 1997, the period when labour reforms were
mostly applied. Wage employment increased mainly
as a result of the increasing share of workers with
atypical contracts, but was compensated for partly by
the decrease in employment under permanent
contracts. Employment without contracts or
unregistered employment expanded mostly in
microenterprises, while fixed term employment
increased mainly in larger size firms. According to
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Figure 2 Total coverage by work contract
Notes The first row columns (light grey) refer to waged-workers in each category as percentages of total
waged-workers. The second row columns (dark grey) refer to social protection coverage as a percentage of
the total waged-workers in the respective category. The indicator used for social protection is the
contribution to pensions.
Sources Data processed by ECLAC on the basis of national household surveys of seven countries: Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Panama.
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household surveys around the year 2000 the increase
in workers without contracts continued, reaching
74 per cent in Peru and 35.8 per cent in Argentina.3
This was associated with the introduction of labour
reforms in search of flexibility in an environment of
weak labour inspection, which was further weakened
by the widely accepted diagnosis attributing rigidities
to legislation. This was read by the employers as a
signal to hire new entrants without contracts.
Labour costs decreased as a result of the increase of
workers with atypical contracts and without
contracts. Labour costs for a worker without a
contract were reduced by around 60 per cent in
comparison to one with a permanent contract, while
the labour cost of workers with a temporary contract
allowed for a reduction of 40 per cent in comparison
to a permanent worker. In Argentina, these changes
resulted in a decrease of non-wage costs from 53 per
cent in 1990 to 40 per cent in 2003; while in Peru
the cost reduction was from 34 to 22 per cent
between 1989 and 2001 (Chacaltana 2005).
3.2 Instability, uncertainty and unprotected labour
Labour flexibility in a volatile macroeconomic
environment facilitates adjustment but results in
decreased labour tenure and a higher job turnover.
Job tenure in Latin America at the end of the 1990s
was 7.6 years compared with 10.5 years in OECD
countries. The IDB estimated a job turnover rate of
between 16 and 35 per cent for 12 countries and in
Mexico and Brazil, the rate was 33 per cent. In a
given year, one in three jobs are created and
destroyed. In Peru, labour tenure decreased from 7.5
years to 4 years following the reforms. Shorter
tenure affects productivity, since incentives to invest
in specific training are reduced.
Labour instability, particularly when social protection
is insufficient, result in uncertainty. Perceptions tend
to widen the expected instability. On average for
Latin America in 2005, while 75 per cent of people
interviewed worried about losing their job in the next
12 months, only 59 per cent responded that there
had been one unemployed adult in the household
during the last 12 months (Latinobarómetro 2005).
Finally, the lack of formally recognised employment
relations and precariousness in the relationship,
results in reduced social protection (Figure 2).
Differences in social protection coverage for those
workers with or without written contracts are
substantial.4 On average, 19 per cent of workers
without contract have access to social protection,
while the likelihood of access to protection is more
than four times higher for workers with contracts.
The type of contract also matters. The permanent
contract gives an 89 per cent probability of being
covered by social protection, while atypical contracts
result in a reduction in access to 61 per cent.
A total of 38 per cent of workers do not have a
written labour contract and 16 per cent work under
atypical contracts. However, two-thirds of those
without contracts are in the informal sector and only
10 per cent among them have access to social
protection. On the other hand, 78 per cent of the
workers with atypical contracts are in the formal
sector and 65 per cent among them have access to
protection. This situation provides grounds for two
conclusions. The first is that coverage problems are
not only in the informal sector, because a significant
and increasing number of workers labouring in the
formal sector are affected. The second is that those
most likely to be excluded from protection are in the
informal sector.
The above observation led the ILO, 30 years after
introducing the concept of the informal sector, to
expand the concept from sector to informal
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Figure 3 Structure of the informal economy,
1990–2005
Sources and notes ECLAC on the basis of
households’ surveys and Tokman (2007). It includes 16
countries in 2005 and in 1990 for the informal
sector. Precarious formal workers in 1990, refers to
five countries. The percentage for 2005 does not
significantly differ for five or 16 countries. It refers to
the arithmetic mean.
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economy. The informal economy is defined as ‘all
economic activities by workers and economic units that
are – in law or in practice – not covered or insufficiently
covered by formal arrangements’ (ILO 2002). It includes
both enterprise and work relationships, and it does
not eliminate the informal sector but expands it to
include all workers that are not sufficiently covered
even if they are employed in formal units of
production. It provides a framework to capture
spurious decentralisation or subcontracting inside
formal units of production.
The informal economy has expanded during the last
decade and a half in Latin America. It went from 57
per cent of non-agricultural employment in 1990 to
64.1 per cent in 2005, with both the informal sector
and precarious workers in the formal sector
increasing, as can be seen in Figure 3. It can also be
observed that the latter grew faster, closely
connected to the increased precariousness during
the reform period in Latin America. Close to 60 per
cent of the expansion of the informal economy is
explained by this factor.
4 Towards a strategy for inclusion and
opportunities
Informality and social exclusion reflect poor access to
resources, low incomes and vulnerability: they also
constitute a market and a policy failure and
particularly, a citizenship failure, since the people
affected are denied entitlements to their economic,
social and labour rights. A renewed strategy for
inclusion of those working in the informal economy
is needed.5
The informal sector includes both enterprises and
families engaging in productive activities, and the
likelihood of progressing towards formal-sector
status is determined mainly by a productive unit’s
capacity for growth. Similarly, the extent to which
employment relations in the informal sector should
be recognised and regulated depends on enterprises’
ability to comply with obligations, which are directly
linked to their economic success. For this reason, the
development of informal-sector production and
progress in the labour sphere must be addressed at
the same time.
Workers in the informal economy are also directly or
indirectly employed beyond the informal sector, in
formal enterprises, where they are subject to
insecurity and lack of labour and social protections.
Misguided labour reforms or ill-designed regulations in
weak enforcement environments need to be
corrected to improve compliance. Finally, protection of
workers in the informal economy and especially those
in the informal sector should be examined in relation
to their contributory capacity to ensure adequate
levels of coverage of health and old age risks.
4.1 Regulation of informal activities
Regulations designed with larger enterprises and
more organised sectors in mind are inadequate for
the needs and conditions of microenterprises. There
is a need for adjustment and simplification to
facilitate compliance. Bureaucratic difficulties hold up
requests to open or close informal business activities,
due to the numerous laws and regulations involved
and administrative inefficiency. As pointed out in a
recent ILO study (2006), these regulations apply
generally to all enterprises, but the smaller ones are
disproportionately affected, as they do not have the
means to overcome the obstacles to doing business.
There are 2.6 times as many such regulations in Latin
America as in OECD countries; only in Africa and the
Middle East are such regulations more numerous
(Loayza et al. 2006). There have been marked
improvements in trade and financial sectors, while
the largest backlog is found in the regulations
governing business licences.
Simplifying bureaucratic procedures constitutes a way
of bringing down access barriers. Numerous
measures have been adopted to implement
simplified registration regimes, both in terms of
unifying registries and administrative steps towards
compliance. Current trends point to the
implementation of a ‘single registry–single window’
regime. This would reduce the cost of formalisation;
however, the obstacles from bureaucratic vested
interests to technical demands raised by oversight
and enforcement actions should not be ignored.
There is room for action regarding the mechanisms
for formalisation. An increasingly popular device is
the recognition of property titles as a mechanism to
have access to credit. The proposed innovation seeks
to simplify the release of a legal property title and to
adapt it to prevalent conditions of de facto
ownership. This course entails disregarding
contractual prerequisites and providing proof of
property title, using alternative means of recognition,
such as long-term usufruct, calling on witnesses and
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having boundaries recognised by third parties that
might have conflicting interests. This addresses a
major obstacle to access to credit, since collateral
requirements, which usually involve assets, represent
a major hurdle in a sector where ‘property’ is not
formalised.
The separation of assets of the individual and the
entrepreneur (an important step for micro-
entrepreneurs) is usually achieved by creating firms of
a diverse legal nature and diverse degrees of
complexity. Requirements associated with this simple
but crucial change to the patrimonial responsibility of
micro-entrepreneurs entail a monetary cost, as well
as compliance with a series of regulations, that
render this enfranchising step towards formality a
difficult one. This process could be simplified by
conferring legal status to the entrepreneur along
with the business licence (Fuentes 1998).
4.2 Labour rights in informal enterprises
Labour law does not fully apply to workers in the
informal sector and few productive units are able to
meet the obligations arising from the establishment
of an employment relationship.
The share of workers without a contract or on
atypical contracts is over 90 per cent in Bolivia and
Guatemala, and reaches about 85 per cent in Mexico
and Ecuador. Pension coverage extends to only 18
per cent of those occupied in the informal sector,
compared with 68 per cent in the formal sector
(Tokman 2006). This difference is partly explained by
the poor pension coverage of own account workers.
Although the difference between wage-employees
is smaller, the coverage of those in microenterprises
is still one-third of those in larger enterprises
(CEPAL 2006). Most workers in the informal sector
are not entitled to employment protection because
their employment relationship is not legally
recognised. On average for Latin America, 78 per
cent of wage workers in microenterprises do not
have a written labour contract.6
Microenterprises are less able to absorb the costs of
employing workers on a formal basis. In Colombia,
only 15 per cent of microenterprises paid any
contribution and 76 per cent could not pay total
labour costs. Sales would have to double to absorb
these obligations (Gómez 1998). In Peru, only 15 per
cent of microenterprises were in a position to
absorb all labour costs. To do so their profits would
decrease between 50 and 100 per cent. More than
half of the microenterprises paid no non-wage
labour costs at all and 49.5 per cent complied only
partially with some obligations (Yañez 1998).
Recognition of the employment relationship would
contribute to improved labour and social protection.
This could be achieved with proof of the existence of
unwritten contracts by registration of regular hours
or periodic wage payments in the accounts or by
witnesses. This would provide the workers with the
necessary credentials to be entitled to protection
and would encourage micro-entrepreneurs to
acquire the necessary skills to do business on a
proper basis. Recognising the existence of a formal
employment relationship generates the pressure
needed to manage the production unit as a proper
business rather than a family enterprise.
This first step will, however, not be sufficient if the
enterprise is unable to absorb the costs of
compliance. Some adjustment to the existing
legislation may be necessary to make it more
applicable, but this should not be through
deregulation: being more responsive to the need of
microenterprises does not mean that existing labour
conditions can be allowed to deteriorate.
In Argentina, Brazil and Peru, special systems for
microenterprises have been introduced. Such
differentiation may prove difficult to implement for
reasons of regulatory inefficiency and as a matter of
principle: they create opportunities for fiscal and
labour law evasion and introduce barriers to
microenterprise growth by setting maximum limits
on capital investment. In labour law, such
differentiation introduces issues of principle by
accepting differential treatment of workers before
the law depending on the size of the enterprise. A
single regulatory system would be preferable with
regard to labour matters (ILO 1991). This does not
exclude differential treatment for other related
issues, such as the introduction of simplified tax
regimes, preferential interest rates, or special
regimes for collective bargaining.
These realities should be recognised, but this does
not exclude intervention. A possible approach would
be to introduce a compulsory minimum threshold on
labour issues. An initial component should consist of
fundamental labour rights as included in the ILO
Declaration of 1998 (freedom of association and
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collective bargaining, elimination of forced and child
labour and of discrimination in respect to
employment and occupation). These amount to the
transfer of human rights into the labour sphere. In
addition, related aspects of working conditions could
be included, as for example: minimum wage, hours
of work and work-related accidents and illness.7
This minimum floor should be enforced for all workers
in the informal sector independently of the size or
form of the unit in which they work. This is not at
odds with the notion of operating with a tolerance
margin, which allows for the constraints encountered
by informal sector production units. Such tolerance
could be acceptable but should not be applied to the
suggested minimum floor. The application of these
rights should be monitored, promoted and controlled
using procedures that take full account of the specific
nature of each issue being regulated.
One possible model would be to establish an
advance commitment to compliance, with targets
used by the ILO to supervise international labour
standards. Another would be to recognise that some
non-compliance is due to ignorance of the legal
obligations involved. The labour inspection should
include a learning component, or as Chile has done
since 2001, could substitute the fine with training for
informal sector entrepreneurs under the supervision
of the relevant labour institution. The ILO (2006) has
also proposed another innovation based on the
assumption that the effect of regulation is enhanced
if there are several possible ways of enforcing
compliance, allowing the problems to be monitored
and solved in a gradual manner.
4.3 Insecurity, vulnerability and atypical
employment contracts
Insecurity and vulnerability are linked to the absence of
explicitly recognised employment relations, but also to
situations governed by atypical labour contracts. This
must be distinguished from the situation of workers
whose employment relationships are ill-defined or not
properly recognised by labour legislation.
Both have increased in recent decades to adapt to
the new economic conditions under globalisation.
Decentralisation of production and labour processes
emerged as an instrument to decrease costs,
particularly labour costs, as well as to increase
productive efficiency. This contributed to a spurious
decentralisation aimed at eroding compliance with
labour regulations by diluting the definition of the
employment relationship. At the same time, there
was a need to adapt to a more open and volatile
international economic environment. Adjustments
were needed and the search for flexibility to diminish
the costs involved became a priority.
As analysed above, labour reforms in Latin America
introduced alternative contracts to the permanent
employment contract with this objective. In general,
these do not affect social protection as long as
workers remain employed; nor are they illegal, as
they were introduced by labour reforms which
encouraged their use. In Argentina and Peru, there
are no significant differences in non-wage labour
costs among contracts. Their main effect has been
insecurity about the continuity of the current
contract. This insecurity affects the worker and the
family as well as productivity, because of the loss of
incentives to innovate and to upgrade skills. For this
reason, while recognising that these contracts are
necessary particularly to promote employment for
women and young people, limits on their use should
be introduced and efforts should focus on making
long-term contracts more flexible.
Spain and Argentina have already followed this
approach. Since the mid-1990s, both countries
reformed the reforms. Spain restricted the use of
fixed term contracts to collective bargaining and
transferred the search for flexibility to the permanent
contract, facilitating the judicial process of firing and
reducing the costs involved. A new tripartite
agreement was reached in 2006 reinforcing the new
orientation and promoting the return to the
permanent contract by converting fixed term
contracts into a permanent one after 24 months of a
contract with the same enterprise or successive
contracts in the same post. It introduced additionally
a 4 years bonus for long-term contracts given to
women, young people and long duration unemployed
and reduced contributions to social security.
Argentina followed the same course in the reforms
of 1998 and 2000, constraining the use of fixed term
contracts, reducing indemnities in permanent
contracts and extending the trial periods. In addition,
contributions to social security were reduced in
contracts for workers older than 45 years, younger
than 24 years and women head of households. Brazil
in 1998 also introduced atypical contracts but made
them conditional upon the creation of new jobs in
order to reduce the potential contract substitution
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and left it to collective bargaining to set upper limits
on the number of contracts to be concluded.
4.4 Ill-defined employment relationships and their
regulation
Ill-defined employment relationships are difficult to
identify or are disguised or unprotected owing to gaps
in labour regulations or compliance control. The rights
and obligations of both parties are often not clear,
which may result in loss of protection. Such cases are
growing in number in the context of globalisation and
decentralisation of production, which makes it
necessary to establish workers’ rights and to determine
who the responsible employer is. Most enterprises
involved in these relations are formal, but workers’
rights in subordinated firms are not necessarily fully
complied with. They are part of the informal economy.
These hidden or ill-defined relations also exist
between formal and informal units, introducing
additional difficulties to their identification.
The ILO adopted an Employment Relationship
Recommendation in 2006 (No. 198), recommending
to ‘formulate and apply a national policy for reviewing
at appropriate intervals and, if necessary, clarifying and
adapting the scope of relevant laws and regulations, in
order to guarantee effective protection for workers
who perform work in the context of an employment
relationship’. The nature and extent of protection
should be defined by national law or practice, or both,
and should include scope, coverage and responsibility
for implementation. To help determine the existence
of an employment relationship, suggested indicators,
other than the regular payment to the worker,
include: that the work is carried out according to the
instructions and under the control of another party;
whether it is performed solely for the benefit of
another person; whether it must be carried out
personally by the worker, within specific working
hours; and whether it required the worker’s availability
and involves the provision of tools and machinery by
the party requesting the work.
The ILO also addressed home work and in 1996
adopted a Convention (No. 177) and a
Recommendation which contributed to the
formulation of a legal framework. Home work is a
long established form of production which, in
appearance, is work performed on own account or
within a family structure. However, it often amounts
to paid subordinate work performed outside the
main enterprise but for the benefit of a
subcontracting enterprise or for an intermediary.
Such work is performed largely by women, with the
help of family members and is not taken into account
by labour legislation. The absence of a recognised
employment relationship leaves the workers
vulnerable and without negotiating power. The
objective is to promote equal treatment between
home workers and other wage earners, taking into
account their special characteristics. This relates to
the right of home workers to establish or join
organisations of their own choosing and to take part
in activities thereof (freedom of association), to
protection against discrimination, the minimum age
for admission to work employment, remuneration,
protection in the field of occupational safety and
health, social security and maternity protection.
In this connection, mention may be made of a recent
law adopted in Chile to regulate subcontracting and
suppliers of temporary staff. The law sets limits only
on the supply of staff for short-term jobs and
exceptional tasks. It requires enterprises to register
and establish a guarantee fund to meet wage costs
and contributions in case of non-compliance of
labour obligations. For subcontracted firms, the
responsibility lies with the subcontractor, but the law
also places responsibilities on the main contractor
and changes the present subsidiary into a joint
responsibility. However, it provides the main
enterprise with the right to require certification of
compliance and to withhold from pending payments
any amounts due in case of non-compliance.
4.5 Social protection for informal workers
Social protection coverage (health and pensions, as
well as maternity) for informal workers requires
strategies that include expanding coverage of present
systems and the development of new instruments
like insurance and pooling of resources for the
excluded. India recently introduced a bill to regulate
employment and service conditions of unorganised
workers and to provide for their safety, social
security, health and welfare, and introduced a
Welfare Fund, funded by government and registered
employers. In the Philippines the Statutory Social
Security system and the health insurance plans have
increased their coverage through voluntary schemes
open to self-employed workers.
From a systemic perspective these rights should be
granted to the people as citizens rather than as
workers and awarded on universality principles. This
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has been the major change in the redesigning of the
‘traditional model’ in Latin America as well as in
completing the private defined contribution pension
systems by adding a solidarity pillar funded from public
resources. The World Bank in its recently published
report on informality (Perry et al. 2007), fully
supported this change both in the case of health and
pensions coverage. In the case of healthcare, it is
recognised that as shocks that go uncovered impose
significant costs to society, there is a case for
providing minimum essential direct cover, de-linked
from the labour contract and financed through
general taxation. Similarly, in the case of insufficient
income in old age, there are social costs involved that
justify a minimum income support not associated
with the labour contract. Bolivia is the only country in
Latin America that has introduced a universal non-
contributory pension (BONOSOL) and Brazil has a
similar system for rural workers (FUNRURAL).8 Chile,
a pioneer country in introducing the privatisation of
the pension and health systems, is taking the lead in
introducing a non-contributory pillar that guarantees
a solidarity pension to all citizens over 65 years old.
Health is covered to a larger extent than pensions
and achieves universality though a combination of
different systems: social insurance in Costa Rica
covers contributors and non-contributors, a public
funded system in Cuba and a mix of public
institutions, social security and private insurance in
Uruguay, Brazil and Chile, among others. The latter
has strengthened access to public health for all
citizens by introducing an attention guarantee of 56
basic pathologies (AUGE) in addition to the existing
national health insurance (FONASA).
De-linking protection from labour participation
would create opportunities to increase employment
and improve business, while guaranteeing security. It
would contribute to reducing the existing protection
deficits but it will require sound fiscal policies and
particularly, the adequate funding of decent health
and pensions coverage. It should also include
maternity and child care, given the potential effect
on the early development of cognitive abilities and
on the participation of women, particularly those
from poor households, in the labour market.
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Notes
* DPhil Oxford University. This article was
presented to the IDS-WIEGO Workshop on
‘Informal Work, Economic Growth and Social
Protection’, held in Sussex, 22–23 October 2007.
1 ‘Higher’ is used to refer to ‘heavier’ regulatory
burden. They refer to a synthetic index obtained as
an average of related components normalised to
vary between 0 and 1.
2 Chile introduced reforms even earlier in 1978 and
1981 under the Pinochet dictatorship. Both
included the promotion of flexibility but
particularly affected collective labour rights in
legislation that were de facto abolished.
3 A study made by the Minister of Labor Employment
and Social Security of Argentina (2006) shows that
29.6 per cent of private employment in 1990 was
without contract, increasing to reach a maximum of
43.4 per cent in 2004 and later decreasing to
39.8 per cent in 2005.
4 Social protection is measured as proxy by the
percentage of workers in each type of contractual
situation that contributes to old age pensions.
5 See also Tokman (2007).
6 It includes 11 countries. In six of them, this
percentage is higher than 90 per cent (CEPAL
2006).
7 This broader minimum threshold has been
incorporated into the free trade agreements
signed by the United States and various countries,
including Mexico, Chile, all the countries of
Central America and Dominican Republic, Peru,
Panama, and Colombia (the latter two still
pending of definitive adoption).
8 The public funds involved are the highest in Bolivia
(1.2 per cent of GNP) and are estimated for the
quasi-universal pension of Chile at 1.0 per cent,
compared with the focused pensions in the
Region that are usually below 0.5 per cent of
GNP.
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